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Abstract
The power of networks manifests itself in a highly non-linear
amplification of a number of effects, and their weakness—
in propagation of cascading failures. The potential sys-
temic risk effects can be either exacerbated or mitigated,
depending on the resilience characteristics of the network.
The goals of this paper are to study some characteristics of
network amplification and resilience. We simulate random
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi networks and measure amplification by vary-
ing node capacity, transaction volume, and expected failure
rates. We discover that network throughput scales almost
quadratically with respect to the node capacity and that the
effects of excessive network load and random and irrepara-
ble node faults are equivalent and almost perfectly anticor-
related. This knowledge can be used by capacity planners
to determine optimal reliability requirements that maximize
the optimal operational regions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The power of networks manifests itself in a highly non-linear
amplification of a number of effects. Probably the most no-
table example is the spread of epidemics, whereby a disease
can spread from one person to many through a human dy-
namics network [14]. The evolution of life on Earth shows,
how species diversity exploded once cells started interact-
ing with each other and sex was invented. This formed a
complex network that amplified the effects of natural selec-
tion [6]. Without this amplification, natural selection would
have progressed linearly at best, taking much more than
four billion years to create todays natural world. In Fi-
nance, the 2007 crisis was an exemplification on how default
on a small number of mortgages brought down the likes of
Lehman Brothers. At the microbiology level, RNA networks
have been shown to generate complex functions that amplify
metabolism, in fact creating real chemical factories [2]. Fi-
nally, the biggest enigma is how networks of neurons amplify
sensory inputs to create cognition [13].
The flip side of amplification is network resilience (or
lack of it). Systemic risk assessment in the financial sup-
ply chain provides a situation where the ability to evaluate
the potential negative impact of blockages in the global fi-
nancial supply chain may prove crucial to the well being
of the banking sector and the macroeconomy. As pointed
out in [11], atomistic risk management in financial systems
is unsatisfactory as it fails to give a salient risk assessment
both at the nodes and for the entire system. Indeed, the
effect of an idiosyncratic event at one node may propagate
to other nodes, thereby resulting in financial instability or
catastrophic failure of other nodes or of the entire network.
Propagation of cascading failure can happen in many types
of interdependent systems [4]. The potential systemic risk
effects can be either exacerbated or mitigated, depending on
the resilience characteristics of the network.
A vast body of research has been focused on the impact
of the structure of the networks and nodes. Phase transi-
tions in networks [12, 16], whereby giant components form
when density reaches a critical point, are frequently used to
study diffusion in networks [15]. Percolation analysis has
been used to measure the structural importance of particu-
lar nodes, in terrorist networks [9] and soccer games [7]. A
number of studies have shown how the structure of a net-
work impacts fault tolerance, showing for instance that scale
free networks are particularly vulnerable to targeted attacks
and immune to random attacks, whereby random networks
are the opposite [1, 10].
The goals of this paper are to study some characteristics
of network amplification and resilience. For this study, we
chose a stylized version of a network where nodes process
generic transactions requiring certain capacity and process-
ing time. We particularly focus on the relationship between
the resilience of a network and the resilience of a typical
node. As these services become part of a larger complex
network that powers the firm’s operations, the overall reli-
ability is less than the reliability of each individual compo-
nent. There is an amplification of fault.
In this study we minimize the effects of structure by using
random networks [8] with homogeneous nodes. We measure
amplification by varying node capacity, transaction volume,
and expected failure rates.
2 NETWORK CONFIGURATION
In this paper, we simulate and discuss a random Erdo˝s–
Re´nyi network [8] that consists of N = 1, 600 identical nodes
representing network hosts.
Each network node represents a server that can simulta-
neously execute up to C independent subtransactions (the
nature of the subtransactions is not essential for this study).
Each subtransaction takes time τ0 to complete (the time
does not depend on the total load on the node). The net-
work is simulated for the duration of Sτ0.
The density of the networks is d, that is, of all possi-
ble N (N − 1) directional connections, only dN (N − 1) are
realized. The network has no loop-back connections.
In addition to being able to execute transactions, each
node can be also used for injecting transactions into the
network (serve as a transaction source) and for terminating
transactions, either by way of committing or aborting (serve
as a transaction sink). During the simulation, transactions
are injected uniformly across the network. The delays be-
tween subsequent transactions are drawn from the exponen-
tial distribution E (1/r), where r is the mean injection rate.
All transactions injected in the network are distributed.
A master transaction T consists of L subtransactions Ti
(i ∈ {1 . . . L}; in our study, L is drawn from the discrete
normal distribution N (10, 4), adjusted to exclude negative
values of L). A master transaction is committed if all its sub-
transactions are committed. Otherwise, the master trans-
action is aborted. The transaction manager is implied and
not simulated.
Transactions are routed using an opportunistic routing
strategy: the node for the next subtransaction is chosen
uniformly at random from all neighbors of the current node.
If the next node is disabled, then another neighbor is chosen.
It is possible for the next subtransaction Ti+1 to be executed
by the same node as the previous subtransaction Ti−1. If all
neighbors are disabled, the subtransaction is aborted, and
the master transaction rolls back.
Once injected in the network, a transaction has the time-
to-live of 60τ0. Since it takes the constant time of 1τ0 for a
transaction to clear a node, the fraction of transactions that
are subject to aborting due to the timeout is ≈ 1.2× 10−35,
and this behavior may be ignored (based on the normal dis-
tribution of L).
We assume that distributed transactions in our network
are not independent (they do not have the ACID property,
which is not uncommon for distributed transactions due to
the Brewer’s theorem [3]). In our model, if a transaction is
aborted for any reason, all other transactions that crossed
path with it in the past T time units (T = 10τ0), are also
aborted with probability p0 = .01.
The network nodes can become disabled in two ways.
First, when a node is overloaded (the actual load at a node
reaches or exceeds its capacity C), it shuts down. In real life,
an overload-related shutdown may be caused by overheating,
network congestion, excessive swapping or other resource
constraints.
Second, the network nodes may fail randomly after an
initial delay drawn from the exponential distribution E(Tf ).
These random failures simulate the effect of the internal un-
reliability. Shorter time to failures correspond to less reliable
nodes.
Initially, all nodes in a network are alive and can per-
form their tasks. Once disabled, however, a node is not
restarted and remains disabled for the rest of the simulation
run—recovery may not be feasible or even possible in au-
tonomous unmanaged networks (say, sensor networks [5]).
All subtransactions currently executed at a disabled node,
and the corresponding master transactions, are aborted.
The network simulator has been implemented in C++
using a discrete event simulation package developed at the
Mathematics and Computer Science Department of Suffolk
University.
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Figure 1: Experimental scenarios; the dashed and the dotted
lines are hypothetical phase boundaries
3 SIMULATION
To study the effect of node failures on the network resilience
and to propose and evaluate resilience measures, we con-
ducted several numerical experiments, some of which are
schematically presented in Figure 1.
In each experiment, the network has been simulated for
a variety of combinations of node capacities and average
edge densities (C, d): d ∈ {0.01, 0.011, 0.015, 0.025, 0.04,
0.055, 0.075, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.75, 0.85, 0.99} and
C ∈ {2, 3, 4 . . . 22} (up to C = 23 for select density values).
3.1 Failing by Overloading
In the first experiment, we started with a fully functional
network with no injected transactions. Then we gradually
increased the injection rate from 0 to r0 (arrow A in Fig-
ure 1) until at least 10−6 of all transactions would abort.
Since this mode of operation is essentially lossless, we call
it superconductive. r0 is defined as the maximum abort-free
rate.
By injecting more than r0 transactions per time unit, we
partially overload the network and switch it into a resistive
mode. The fraction of aborted transactions monotonically
increases with the transaction injection rate r, until at some
point the network chokes (all network nodes become over-
loaded and shut down) before the end of a simulation run
(arrow B in Figure 1). We denote this maximum choke-free
injection rate as r1, and we call this operation mode dielec-
tric. In the same spirit, we call r0 and r1 phase transition
injection rates.
Both r0 and r1 depend on the simulation running time
(shorter runs allow the network to terminate choke-free for
higher injection rates). However, the difference between
shorter runs of Sτ0 and longer runs of 2Sτ0 is within 5%. All
further results have been obtained for S = 84, 600τ0 (“one
day”).
Since r1 is the highest meaningful injection rate, we will
sometimes normalize injection rates by introducing ρ0 =
r0/r1 and ρ = r/r1. We have 0 ≤ {ρ0, ρ} ≤ 1.
For each network configuration, we measured r0 and r1.
Figure 2 shows both the experimental points and the best
fit approximations that will be discussed in section 4.
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Figure 2: Phase transition injection rates r0 (below the
dashed line) and r1 (above the dashed line), in transactions
per τ0, vs node capacity C, for various network densities d;
solid lines represent best fit approximations
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Figure 3: Phase transition node fault ratem0 vs node capac-
ity C, for various network densities d; solid lines represent
best fit approximations
3.2 Failing by Internal Faults
In the second experiment, just like in the first one, we started
with a fully functional network with no injected transac-
tions, and gradually increased the injection rate to r0 (the
network is still in the superconductive state). Then, at the
fixed injection rate, we started failing random nodes after
random delays, simulating unrecoverable internal faults (ar-
row C in Figure 1).
At the end of each simulation run, we measured the frac-
tion of failed nodes m and the state of the network (either
resistive or dielectric). Letm0 be the smallest m that causes
the network to choke and switch to the dielectric state. We
call it phase transition node fault rate. Figure 3 shows both
the experimental values of m0 and the best fit approxima-
tions.
3.3 Failing by Overloading and Internal Faults
Finally, in the third experiment we combined the two mech-
anisms that cause network failures.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram for C = 4 and d = 0.2. Plus “+”
and minus “−” signs indicate resistive and dielectric points,
respectively. The solid line is the best fit phase boundary
Indeed, we learned from the previous two experiments
that the phase transition between the resistive and dielectric
states takes place in the points Z1 (m = 0, ρ = 1) and Z2
(m = m0, ρ = ρ0) in Figure 1. These points correspond to
the first and second experiments. Point Z3 (m = 1, ρ = 0)
is also on the phase boundary (it takes all nodes to be faulty
to fail a network in the presence of zero traffic).
To locate the rest of the phase boundary (tentatively
shown as a dashed line in Figure 1), we executed a number
of simulation runs that moved the network from the origi-
nal state O to various boundary states Z’, Z”, etc. (arrows
D’ and D”) by simultaneously varying the injection rate
and the proportion of the internally faulty nodes. The re-
sult of this experiment was a phase transition diagram for
the network for each tested configuration (C, d). The dia-
grams show the boundary between the resistive and dielec-
tric states (we did not instrument the simulator to detect the
boundary between the resistive and superconductive states,
though random experiments suggest that it probably follows
the dotted line in Figure 1). An example of a phase diagram
for C = 4 and d = 0.2 is shown in Figure 4.
3.4 Dependent Transactions
We explored the relationship between the transaction inter-
dependency probability p0 and the simulated values of r0, r1,
and m0. Of them, only r1 is statistically correlated with p0:
changing p0 from 0 to 1 increases r1 by approx4%. Indeed,
in the presense of strong correlation between transactions,
an aborted transaction always causes a cascaded rollback,
that, in turn, releaves network conjestion and allows higher
injection rate—at the cost of lower commit rate.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Dense and Sparse Networks
We observed that in all simulated scenarios, the network
behavior is determined, in the first place, by the network
density d. The borderline between different behaviors is
fuzzy and lies in the range d0 = [0.01 . . . 0.02]. In the dense
networks (d > d0), most performance characteristics do not
depend on d, while in the sparse networks (d < d0), the
dependence on d is strong to the extent that many network
measures diverge as d tends to 0.
4.2 Amplification
One goal of the study was to find the correlation between
node capacity C (which corresponds to the material invest-
ment into the networking infrastructure) and the aggregate
network throughput expressed either in terms of r0 or r1.
The relationship between C and r0 and r1 for various net-
work densities d is shown in Figure 2.
For both dense and sparse networks, both r0 (C) and
r1 (C) can be approximated using a power function:
ri (C) ≈ Ai (C − 2)
βi . (1)
The exponents βi for the dense networks are ≈ 1.7 and ≈
2.1, respectively. Both βi’s tend to 1 as d tends to 0. The
mantissas Ai for the dense networks are ≈ 0.7 and ≈ 2.8,
respectively. Both Ai increase and possibly diverge as d
tends to 0.
We observed the quadratic amplification effect: doubling
node capacity almost quadruples the throughput.
4.3 Effect of Faulty Nodes
We could not easily find an explainable closed form approx-
imation of m0 (C). Eq. 2 seems to be in good agreement
with the experimental results (Figure 3).
m0 (C) ≈
(A− 1) erf
(
log10(C−2)
α
− β
)
+ (A+ 1)
2
. (2)
The purpose of Eq. 2 is chiefly to estimate the dependen-
cies between m0 and C, not to predict them. In particular,
we are not sure at this point if, as C tends to infinity, all
(m0)s tend to 0, to a common positive asymptote or to in-
dividual positive asymptotes. Exploring this issue would
require more computational resources that we can presently
afford.
Based on the data that we have, we conclude that for the
dense networks, the best fit curves described by Eq. 2 con-
verge to a value of A in the range [0..0.23]. In other words, in
the best case it would take 30% of internally faulty nodes to
fail a dense network with infinite buffer space in the presence
of the highest superconductive injection rate. In the worst
case, the network may fail even with negligibly few faulty
nodes. In general, as the node capacity increases, the pro-
portion of nodes that must be disabled to choke the network
at the insertion rate r0, decreases. This is not surprising,
since r0 itself scales up with C, so we expose the network to
higher volumes of traffic.
4.4 Equivalence of Excessive Traffic and Faulty
Nodes
Figure 5 shows the node fault rate m0 vs maximum super-
conductive injection rate ρ0, for various network densities d
(different symbols) and capacities C. The two measures are
closely correlated.
The solid lines represent best fit approximations (Eq. 3).
m0 (ρ0) ≈ 1−Aρ
β
0 . (3)
The less dense networks correspond to the lines with the
more horizontal initial segment at ρ0 = 0.
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Figure 5: Node fault rate m0 vs network load ρ0, for various
network densities d and capacities C; solid lines represent
best fit approximations; the dashed line is the diagonal of
the 1× 1 rectangle
For dense networks, the mantissa A of Eq. 3 tends to 1,
and the exponent β tends to 1.15. For sparse networks, both
parameters grow and possibly diverge as d tends to 0.
To a first approximation, the relationship between the
network resilience parameters ρ0 and m0 is almost linear,
with the slope of −1. This means that tolerating additional
superconductive traffic ∆ρ0 (that is, narrowing the gap be-
tween superconducting–resistive and resistive–dielectric in-
jection rates) is equivalent to disabling extra network nodes
∆m0 due to internal faults, and the other way around:
∆ρ0 ≈ −∆m0. (4)
Each line in Figure 5 corresponds to a particular network
density d, and the experimental points along the line corre-
spond to various node capacities C. The points with higher
values of C have higher ρ0 and lower m0. If the statement
about the asymptotic behavior ofm0 with respect to C (that
we made in subsection 4.3) is true, than there is a conver-
gence point ≈ (0.75, 0.3) on the chart. No network would
be able to sustain higher relative superconductive injection
rate or choke with fewer faulty nodes.
4.5 Combined External and Internal Effects
In the first two experiments, we either exposed a healthy
network to excessive traffic or faulted random nodes carrying
the highest sustainable superconductive traffic. We found
these mechanisms complementary and even commensurable
(especially for dense networks).
In reality, a network can be simultaneously subject both
to internal irreparable faults and external excessive traffic.
Figure 4 shows the network phase transition diagram for
C = 4 and d = 0.2 for all possible values of 0 ≤ m ≤ 1
(including m0) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (including ρ0). The bound-
ary between the choking and choke-free areas was calculated
using best fit parameter estimation for the Eq. 5.
m0 (r) ≈ 1−Aρ
β. (5)
We found that A ≈ 1 is almost independent of either C
or d. On the contrary, β is independent of d but diminishes
from 1.35 to 1.15 as C increases from 2 to 9: the dependence
of m on ρ is more linear for higher capacity networks.
Incidentally, Eq. 5 is identical to Eq. 3, aside from the
actual values of β (which are still the same in both equations
for C ≥ 9). At present, we do not know whether this is a
coincidence or a rule.
5 CONCLUSION
Our research revealed a number of interesting characteris-
tics of random transactional networks. We studied trans-
action failures as a function of two factors, random node
faults and incoming transaction volume. These revealed
three phases of particular interest: “superconductive” (no
transactions fail), “resistive” (some transactions fail), and
“dielectric” (all transactions fail). We found that the injec-
tion rates associated with the phase transitions, scale almost
quadratically with respect to the node capacity, thus provid-
ing network throughput amplification and allowing capacity
planners to determine optimal reliability requirements that
maximize the superconductive region.
We also found that at the resistive-to-dielectric phase
transition, the effects of excessive network load and inter-
nal, spontaneous, and irreparable node faults are equivalent
and almost perfectly anticorrelated. This knowledge can be
used to compensate faults in isolated unmanaged networks
by properly and predictably adjusting external traffic or to
determine the amount of spare nodes needed to sustain pre-
dictable bursts of traffic.
Further study is required to quantify and qualify the ef-
fects of network structure including density, modularity, and
assortativity.
As discussed in the introduction, the overriding goal of
this research is to study the power of networks in general.
Further study will generalize the findings to include a larger
class of networks and applications whereby resilience will
be substituted by capability. For example, such general-
ization will open new research areas in economic develop-
ment whereby economic productivity is a result of complex
economic networks. This research could also potentially be
applied to our understanding of systemic risk and effective
governance, to name a few, through a greater appreciation
of network dynamics.
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